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The TRIPS Agreement concluded with a win-win situation where both the developed and developing countries could 
incorporate their supportive provisions. But the inclusion of a broad compulsory licensing provision, which is a supportive 
provision for the developing countries, was against the wishes of United States which was always against any form of 
restrictions on the rights of the patentee. In order to achieve its aims which it had failed in the TRIPS Agreement, USA 
began to use its new strategy to prevent countries from using this TRIPS flexibility, by the threat of trade retaliations 
through Special 301 Report. India being one of the victims of US strategy had many a times faced this intimidation from 
USA. The researcher has thoroughly analysed the Indian position in the Special 301 Report till 2018. Also, the researcher 
scrutinized the effect such an act on India and how the Indian Government responded to such situation. The researcher could 
found that such unwelcomed behaviour on the part of the luring market in the world had affected the public health and 
access to patented life saving drugs in India.  Any such activity is in violation of principles embodied in the TRIPS 
Agreement and similar international commitments and also against the basic human right to health. The researcher suggests 
for a strong protest against such activities either by putting the matter before WTO-DSB or by forming a regional 
collaboration with other similarly affected countries and take retaliatory action against US. 
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The conflict between patents and public health is 
not a novel one. A patent gives the patentee a 20 year 
exclusive right over his patented product/process, but 
creates for the common man, the problems of 
availability, accessibility and affordability of 
lifesaving drugs. This exclusive right allows the 
patentee to decide the price of the drug, which will 
normally be unaffordable to the low and middle 
income countries.  
The patent legislations over the globe which are 
tuned in light of TRIPS Agreement (Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights)1 are equipped 
with the provision of compulsory license. Compulsory 
licensing is when a government allows someone else 
to produce the patented product or process without the 
consent of the patent owner.2 In other words, it is an 
authorization given by a national authority to a 
person, without or against the consent of the title-
holder, for the exploitation of a subject matter 
protected by a patent or other intellectual property 
rights.3 Countries can grant compulsory license in a 
variety of situations including instances of abuse of 
the exclusive right by the patentee such as 
unaffordable price, non-availability etc., emergency 
use or public non-commercial use by the Government.  
This TRIPS flexibility was further strengthened by 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, 4 whereby utmost freedom has been 
given to countries to issue compulsory license for the 
protection of public health. Both these international 
documents together provide ample freedom to the 
member nations to use this flexibility to tackle  
the problems of availability, accessibility and 
affordability of patented medicines. Thus, compulsory 
licensing functions as a balancer of two conflicting 
interests viz., patent and public health. This is 
especially true for developing countries like India. 
The experience around the globe shows that 
developing countries are being pressurised by USA, 
the hub of pharmaceutical industry, to restrict/prohibit 
the use of compulsory licensing by these countries. 
The United States which is always against any forms 
of restriction including compulsory licensing on the 
rights of the patentee prevents the developing 
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countries from using this TRIPS flexibility, by the 
threat of trade retaliations through their Special 301 
Report.  This is in violation of principles embodied in 
the TRIPS Agreement and similar international 
commitments and also against the basic human right 
to health. 
 
Trade Retaliations for Compulsory License: The 
Special 301 
The establishment of The TRIPS Agreement in 
April 15, 1994 was a significant step as far as 
intellectual property regime is concerned.  It 
concluded with a win-win situation where both the 
developed and developing countries could incorporate 
their supportive provisions. This is especially true in 
the case of provision relating to compulsory license. 
This flexibility in the TRIPS Agreement had 
succeeded to overcome the persistent resistance from 
USA, to form an important public interest protector 
for the developing countries. But the USA began to 
use its new strategy to achieve its aims which it had 
failed in the TRIPS Agreement. Thus through the 
intimidation of trade retaliations/sanctions USA 
prevented other countries from using compulsory 
license. This is achieved through the Special  
301 threat whereby USA exerts pressure on a foreign 
country which has a wide compulsory license 
provision or which had issued a compulsory license to 
change its policy on compulsory license to create a 
USA inventor friendly environment with an 
intimidation of trade sanctions. 
The Special 301 is a mean that the United States 
employs to ensure protection to its intellectual 
property in a foreign country. It is the result of an 
annual review of the state of IP protection and 
enforcement in U.S. trading partners around the 
world, which the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) conducts pursuant to Section 
182 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,  
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, and the  
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 
2015 (19 U.S.C. §2242).5 The US Trade 
Representative’s (USTR’s) Special 301 Report - a 
Congressionally-mandated annual report that has been 
issued every year beginning in 1989 identifies trade 
barriers to US companies and products in foreign 
shores due the host country’s intellectual property 
laws, including trademarks, patents, copyright, trade 
secrets, etc.6 
Under the Special 301 Report countries are listed 
as ‘Priority Foreign Countries’ (PFC), ‘Priority 
Watch List’ (PWL) and ‘Watch List’ (WL) countries 
depending on the gravity of IPR violation. The aim 
of the 301 process was to push and prod the 
developing countries into accepting intellectual 
property rules that would allow their economies to 
be integrated into a global knowledge economy 
being led by US entrepreneurs. For this purpose it 
was more important for countries to give the feeling 
that their behaviour on intellectual property was the 
subject of constant surveillance. Thus the special 
301 report threatens and rewards countries via 
inclusion on or delisting from its annual ‘Watch 
List’, ‘Priority Watch List’ and Priority Foreign 
Country list and has the power to implement 
unilateral trade sanctions when U.S. demands are not 
met. It is therefore a weapon of intimidation for USA 
against foreign countries to be in pace with the US 
IP standards thereby protecting the US inventors 
rights in foreign countries. Trade sanctions were the 
most effective way to get quick action from a 
country on intellectual property.7 
The major change that made to the Special 301 
process by the TRIPS is that the agreement had 
specifically prohibited unilateral sanctions and 
launched a dispute resolution process by the 
establishment of a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to 
deal with disputes between WTO members thereby 
putting an end to the Section 301 retaliations by the 
USA. Thus Article 23.2(a) of WTO agreement on 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes8 reads:  
“Members shall not make a determination to the 
effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have 
been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of 
any objective of the covered agreements has been 
impeded, except through recourse to dispute 
settlement in accordance with the rules and 
procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any 
such determination consistent with the findings 
contained in the panel or Appellate Body report 
adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered 
under this Understanding;” 
As it is clear from the provision, the prohibition is 
not only limited to any unilateral sanctions but also on 
any ‘determination to the effect that that a violation 
has occurred’. Therefore even inclusion of a country 
in the special 301 watch list, putting such country 
under the fear of sanction itself is violative of WTO 
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Agreement on Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 
Unfortunately, USA surmounted this prohibition by 
amending its Trade Act to the effect that the section 
301 will not get affected by the WTO Agreement. 
Thus the amended Act provided that: 
 “A foreign country may be determined to deny 
adequate and effective protection of intellectual 
property rights, notwithstanding the fact that 
the foreign country may be in compliance with the 
specific obligations of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
referred to in Section 3511(d)(15) of this title”.6 
The effect of such an amendment is that the Special 
301 review continues with its full vigour which is a 
clear violation of the WTO Agreement. The only 
change that made to this process is that whereas in the 
pre-1994 period the US appeared to be relying on a 
credible threat of sanctions as its main tool to promote 
compliance with its wishes, after the WTO the main 
tool of persuasion was “to give countries the feeling 
that their behaviour on intellectual property was the 
subject of constant surveillance.9 For this purpose, it 
was more important to list many countries as subject 
to the watchful gaze of USTR than it was to actually 
impose sanctions.10 
 
Compulsory Licensing, Special 301 and India  
India was one of the first countries to be included 
in the Priority Foreign country list in 1991. The report 
specifically stated that India had overly broad 
compulsory licensing provisions,11 triggering the 301 
investigation in May 1991. Following a 9 month, 301 
investigation and after determining India’s action as 
unreasonable and burdened or restricted US 
commerce, the USTR terminated its investigation and 
USA imposed trade sanction on India. In April 1992, 
the United States suspended duty-free privileges 
under Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for 
$60 million in trade from India. This suspension 
applied principally to pharmaceuticals, chemicals and 
related products. Benefits on certain chemicals added 
to GSP in June 1992 were withheld from India, 
increasing the trade for which GSP is suspended to 
approximately $80 million.12 India’s priority ‘Foreign 
Country’ status continued in 1992 and 1993. 
India issued its first ever compulsory license in 
2012. Though from 1994 India was designated in the 
‘Priority Watch List’ till 2017, from 2012 issuance of 
compulsory license was cited as a major patent 
deterioration causing India to be continued in the 
List.13  The 2012 Special 301 Report stated that the 
United States will closely monitor developments 
concerning compulsory licensing of patents in India 
following the broad interpretation of Indian law in a 
recent decision by the Controller General of Patents.14  
The same reason had made India to be remained on 
the Priority Watch List in 2013.15 Thus when the 
Indian Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) 
upheld the Controller’s Decision in 2013, this was 
taken note by the USTR and stated in its 2013 Report 
that ‘the United States will also continue to monitor 
closely developments concerning compulsory 
licensing of patents in India, particularly following 
the broad interpretation of Indian law in a recent 
decision by the Indian Intellectual Property Appellate 
Board (IPAB)’.16 
In its 2014 submission, the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) 
had urged the elevation of India into the Priority 
Foreign Country List citing the reason of compulsory 
license and the likelihood of Indian Government to 
issue more compulsory licenses. Though not labelled 
as a Priority Foreign Country, in the 2014 Special 301 
report India remained on the Priority Watch List and 
the report had noted almost all the issues raised by the 
PhRMA and an out-of-Cycle Review was planned 
against India which was rejected by India.17 It is thus 
clear from this inclusion that the USTR supports the 
pharmaceutical multinationals rather than the interest 
of WTO members in protecting right to health. 
Continuing on the ‘Priority Watch List’, the Report 
stated that it continues to monitor India’s application 
of its compulsory licensing law. 
It is noteworthy that in its 2015 submission 
PhRMA exposed its dissatisfaction with India’s 
compulsory license episodes. Starting from the only 
one compulsory license granted way back in 2012 
PhRMA blamed the Indian Government for even 
considering the patented medicines for compulsory 
license under Section 92 of the Patent Act. They 
argued that these are against the TRIPS Agreement 
and they had also appreciated the Government for 
rejecting the compulsory license applications.18 When 
the compulsory license applications were rejected by 
India in 2015, this was appreciated by the USA in 
2016 Report. 
In this regard it is notable that in 2016 public 
hearing U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) stated 
that “the Government of India has privately reassured 
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India it would not use Compulsory Licenses for 
commercial purposes. USIBC would be further 
encouraged if the Government of India made a public 
commitment to forego using compulsory licensing for 
commercial purposes and in public emergencies only, 
which would greatly enhance legal certainty for 
innovative industries.”19 This was condemned by 
various public groups. But later on 22 March 2016, 
the government press office made a brief statement 
that such reports are factually incorrect and it also 
stated that India retains the sovereign right to utilize 
the flexibilities provided in the international IPR 
regime.20 But doubts still exist as to this assurance 
especially because of the fact that India had issued 
only one compulsory license and rejected all other 
applications.21 
At the same time the Union for Affordable Cancer 
Treatment (UACT) alleged that the United State 
Trade Representative Ambassador Michael From an 
that “the DIPP is reportedly opposing the compulsory 
license, motivated primarily by concerns that a 
compulsory license would create trade and foreign 
policy problems with the United States”.22 It also 
contended that “the decision to put off judgement on 
issuing a compulsory license came during a period 
when the USTR officials have criticized the Indian 
government over two other disputes involving drug 
patents, including the US government criticism of the 
rejection of the Novartis evergreening patents on 
imatinib, and US government criticism of the 
Comptroller of Patent’s decision to grant a 
compulsory license on Bayer’s patents on sorafenib, a 
$65,000 per year drug for kidney and liver cancer.”23 
Thus it allege that the USTR put pressure on the 
Indian government, and to influence the intellectual 
property policy of India in such a way as to severely 
restrict access to newer medicines for cancer patients 
and to restrict the use of compulsory license by the 
developing countries. 
The US pressurisation tactic continued in 2017 also 
whereby the report noted that innovative companies 
remain concerned about the potential threat posed to 
their IP through the possible use of compulsory 
licensing and patent revocation, as well as overly 
broad criteria for issuing such licenses and 
revocations under the India Patents Act.24 It is also 
noteworthy here to mention here that in the public 
hearing process for the 2018 Special 301, 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA), Biotechnology Innovation 
Organization (BIO), Alliance for Fair Trade with 
India (AFTI)are alleging that  India’s compulsory 
licensing provisions provide wide authority to grant 
compulsory license, especially the working 
requirement. They have also pointed out the Draft 
National Pharmaceutical Policy, 2017 in which 
reference is made of usage of Compulsory licensing 
or Paragraph 19 to control prices for patented 
products as against the principles of the patent laws as 
well as against India’s WTO TRIPS obligations.25 The 
U.S.-India Strategic Partnership Forum (USISPF), 
while pointing out the development in the Indian IP 
system, acknowledged that India should desist from 
issuing compulsory licensing of patented technologies 
and also acknowledged that the recognition of 
compulsory license as mechanism of price control of 
patented medicines in the Draft National 
Pharmaceutical Policy, 2017 as against Patent Law 
and TRIPS. 
At the same time NGO’s such as Public Citizen, 
Knowledge Economy International (KEI), Federation 
of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(FICCI) stressed the point that countries have enough 
freedom to use the compulsory license flexibility and 
there are no limited grounds specified in the TRIPS 
under which a license can be issued. Therefore no 
citation of TRIPS compliant compulsory license 
should be there in the 2018 Special 301 Report. KEI 
also noted that the United States has at least 15 
separate statutes that are used to permit non-voluntary 
use of patents and also by far, the most frequent user 
of compulsory licenses.26 These organisations have 
noted that India had issued only one compulsory 
license which is TRIPS complaint based on the 
rational of public policy and access to affordable life-
saving drug to the citizens. Therefore India cannot be 
blamed on the same. In its report was prepared by the 
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion 
(DIPP) in the Ministry of Commerce on 2018 
Special 301 Report, it noted that “The provisions 
relating to Compulsory Licenses under the Patents 
Act are fully compliant with Articles 30 and 31 of 
the TRIPS agreement and Article 5 of the Paris 
Convention.”27 
Thus as far as India is concerned though it had 
issued only one compulsory license USTR continues 
to mention India’s 2012 compulsory license as a 
major concern for USA till the very recent 2017 
Special 302 Report. The main reason is to put 
pressure on India so as to restrict the issuance of 
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compulsory license in India which is the “pharmacy 
of the developing countries”. 
India is not the only country that faced such 
intimidation by the USA for its public health 
protective policies. Brazil is the country which had 
successfully used the compulsory license threat to 
reduce the price of life saving drugs for a number of 
times. But in all these cases Brazil had to accept the 
price reduction instead of issuing compulsory licenses 
because Ministry of Development, Industry, and 
Trade was under pressure from other economic 
sectors that believe that compulsory license may 
cause loss of exports and/or foreign investments.28 
Along with this Brazil had been brought before the 
WTO DSB by the USA after being put on the special 
301 report, for the local working requirement in its 
patent law which was one of the primary grounds for 
granting compulsory license till the TRIPS 
Agreement and following compulsory license threat 
by Brazil in 2000.29 
Another country is Indonesia where it was put on 
the priority watch list in the 301 report from 2013 to 
2017 due to its compulsory license for Government 
public non-commercial use in 2012. Adding to the list 
is Thailand. Following its public non-commercial 
compulsory licensing in 2007, Thailand was elevated 
to priority watch list from watch list. Following this in 
July 2007, the USTR withdrew duty-free access to the 
United States (US) market for three Thai products 
under the US Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP).30 Thailand continued to be one of the priority 
watch list countries till the 2017 Special 301 Report.  
The mere reference in the Special 301 Report is 
important - it is a form of sanction and an 
inappropriate warning against countries exercising 
established rights to promote public health.31 For 
instance, when the Government of India considered a 
compulsory license for dasatinib, a drug for 
leukaemia that Bristol-Myers Squibb priced at $108 
per day, in a country with GNI per capita of $1,570, 
USTR was widely reported to have pressured India 
and the license was blocked.32 Another worrying 
example was the pressure exercised by the United 
States on Thailand in early 2000, when the Thai 
government attempted to issue a compulsory license 
for the formulation patent of the AIDS drug 
didanosine (ddI). The US responded by threatening 
Thailand with trade sanctions. The Thai government 
consequently ended up rejecting activists’ calls for a 
compulsory license because it was afraid of 
potentially serious adverse consequences for its 
economy as this threat came at a time when the Thai 
economy was reeling from the widespread South East 
Asian financial crisis.33 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of Indian experience regarding the 
Special 301 for its compulsory license provision/grant 
shows that India is being continuously pressurised by 
the USA for changing its policy on compulsory 
licensing and to prohibit India from using the public 
health saviour flexibility of compulsory license. It is 
paradoxical that USA which always exerts pressure 
on the developing countries from using compulsory 
license, many a times utilised the same flexibility,34 
while India has issued it only once. It is not a unique 
case of India, but whenever a developing country use 
or tries to use a TRIPS compliant compulsory license, 
they have been listed in the Special 301 Report so as 
to give the feeling that they are under observation by 
USA. This feeling of threat from USA itself does 
matter for the developing countries because they 
always prefer to avoid the risk of any dispute with 
USA and therefore do some or the other modifications 
to their intellectual property to avoid any clash with 
the largest economy in the world. According to Peter 
Drahos & John Braithwaite, every year as the 
deadline for the USTR’s Special 301 review 
approached countries would rush through some 
amendments to their intellectual property law, perhaps 
put a few more pirates in jail, increase penalties or to 
take some other action, all in an effort to demonstrate 
their commitment to respecting their US intellectual 
property.’35 
This ‘immediate commitment’ to the US 
intellectual property is perceptible from the Special 
301review itself and is articulated in the words of 
Richard W. Fisher, Deputy U.S. Trade 
Representative, Subcommittee on International 
Economic Policy and Trade House Committee on 
International Relations: 
‘One fascinating aspect of the Special 301 process 
occurs just before we make our annual 
determinations, when there is often a flurry of activity 
in those countries desiring not to be listed or to be 
moved to a lower list. IP laws are suddenly passed or 
amended, and enforcement activities increase 
significantly.’37 
The public health will override any private interest 
over any intellectual property. The basis of 
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intellectual property itself is the promotion of useful 
arts and science that is the public interest and not the 
protection of the rights of the patentee. But for the 
USA, the baseline for property rights has moved quite 
far in the direction of private reward over public 
access. Therefore interest of the patentee cannot be 
seen above the life of the patients suffering from fatal 
diseases. Any such action to undermine the public 
health is a violation of basic human rights. Reducing 
the number of compulsory licenses, preventing 
developing countries from sourcing generic cancer 
drugs from the few countries that could actually 
manufacture them, is in fact systematically ending 
any hope for cancer patients to live longer and better 
lives. In such a line the US actions on the developing 
countries to restrict the use of compulsory license for 
life saving drugs can only be seen as a major human 
rights violation. 
The United States shall not seek, through Special 
301, negotiation, sanction, trade preference, or 
otherwise, the revocation or revision of any 
intellectual property or pharmaceutical market 
regulation of any developing country that promotes 
access to affordable pharmaceuticals or medical 
technologies. USA should not indulge in any activity 
that undermine or interfere with the rights of the 
WTO member countries in utilising any TRIPS 
flexibilities including compulsory license. The 
developed countries including India should be 
courageous enough to put the matter before WTO 
DSB. Another possible solution is the formation of 
regional collaboration by developing countries under 
the platform of which these countries can collectively 
bargain/fight against any such actions by the 
developed countries. This can be done either by 
initiating WTO  Dispute Settlement Procedure against 
the country that implement actions to restrict the 
usage of compulsory license by developing countries 
or by resorting to the same retaliatory actions by 
developed countries against such countries. This 
mechanism is more effective as being developing 
countries, developed countries may not consider any 
retaliatory action by a single developing country as 
significant on it wherein the action is from a number 
of developing countries, developed countries might 
consider it as substantial and withdraw its illegal 
tactic against such countries. 
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